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116 Abstract
This paper evaluates whether the agency problem in public administration shapes 
Spanish municipalities’ tax policy. To this aim, we have considered 2,431 Spanish 
municipalities for the period from 2002 to 2013.
We find significant evidence of tax mimicking of neighboring municipalities, in 
both property tax and car tax. However, incumbents are not signaling their com-
petence through tax competition. Rather, expenditure spillovers explain this inter-
action. Municipalities seek to have the same services and infrastructures as their 
neighbors. The fact that there is not tax benchmarking does not mean that the 
agency problem is not present in Spanish municipalities. The agency problem is 
one of the reasons corruption is so widespread among Spanish municipalities. 
Regarding the further policy implications of our findings, legislation should direct 
municipal governments’ decisions towards the real needs of their constituencies.
Keywords: property tax, car tax, tax mimicking, agency problem, municipal 
government
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper evaluates whether local governments make tax decisions just focusing 
on their economic or budgetary features or whether the tax rates of neighboring 
municipalities are also or mainly taken into account.
The theoretical framework surrounding this tax competition strategy would be the 
principal-agent problem (agency problem). This theory says that the agent is better 
informed than the principal in a political setting in which voters, as principals, elect 
politicians who, as agents, make policy choices that affect voters (Alt, Lassen and 
Shanna, 2006). The principal-agent theory shows that lack of transparency may 
create an advantage for policymakers in achieving their goals: incumbents may 
mimic neighboring tax rates to signal their competence with the aim of being re-
elected. Electoral competition is an effective solution to the principal-agent prob-
lem among politicians and voters (Wittman, 1989). This author argues theoretically 
that competition, reputation and monitoring reduce opportunistic behavior on the 
part of politicians. Nevertheless, we assume that, in an environment of political 
competition, elected officials can be expected to exaggerate their accomplishments 
through budget manipulation (Mayper, Granof and Giroux, 1991). One way to sig-
nal their competence is to benchmark neighboring councils’ tax rates.
Within the agency theory, the literature has used three specific mechanisms to 
explain this fiscal interaction or competition among local governments (munici-
palities, regions, or states): expenditure spillovers, yardstick competition, and tax 
competition (Manski, 1993).
First, according to the expenditure spillovers idea, since municipal expenditures 
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117other words, expenditures on local public services can have an impact on nearby 
jurisdictions.
Second, the tax competition theory, posited by Tiebout (1956), shows that citizens 
will move to another town if taxes are much higher than those in neighboring 
municipalities. 
Third, the logic of yardstick competition, was first shown by Salmon (1987), who 
states that yardstick competition is an issue stemming from information asym-
metry, i.e. it is difficult or costly for voters to evaluate the performance of their 
government.
Each government has an incentive to do better than governments in other jurisdic-
tions in terms of taxes and services. The strength of this incentive depends on the 
ability and willingness of citizens to assess comparative performance. If these 
conditions are met, comparisons will serve as a basis for assessing politicians in 
power. Thus, politicians in power will feel that a good relative performance will 
increase their probability of being re-elected. 
In this respect, yardstick competition in Spanish municipalities would have a pos-
itive and a negative implication, simultaneously. Positive, for if incumbents try to 
signal their competence through fiscal policies, this means that citizens pay atten-
tion to municipal fiscal performance when voting. This is positive, since it means 
that tax payers care about the use of public funds and will not accept misuse of 
those funds. But if incumbents are setting tax policies according to their neigh-
bors’ tax levels instead of the real needs of their municipalities, the provision of 
public services will not be optimal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 pre-
sents data, variables and the econometric model. Section 4 discusses results and 
section 5 concludes and suggests future research.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 TAX MIMICKING AMONG GOVERNMENTS
Research on tax mimicking shows mixed evidence. Besley and Case (1995) find 
that if voters are against additional taxes, even a small increase may force them to 
look elsewhere. However, if taxes are rising everywhere, voters may be convinced 
that a tax increase is necessary. In this case, even a large increase may be politi-
cally acceptable. Provided that voters make comparisons among jurisdictions, 
incumbents may look at neighboring governments’ taxing behavior before chang-
ing taxes at home. This would give rise to yardstick competition among jurisdic-
tions, each caring about what the others are doing. Accordingly, tax changes seem 
to be a significant determinant of who is elected, rationalizing effort put into curb-
ing tax increases that are not in line with those of the neighbors. Besley and Case 
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118 states where the governor runs for re-election, which is a clear indication that 
yardstick competition explains tax interaction. Solé-Ollé (2003) shows that tax 
rates are higher and the reaction to neighbors’ tax rates is lower when the electoral 
margin is high and when left-wing parties control government. Delgado, Lago-
Peñas and Mayor (2015), on a sample of 2,713 Spanish municipalities, find evi-
dence of neighbor tax mimicking in the property tax and the motor vehicle tax.
Empirical analysis has found it difficult to identify which of the three possibilities 
(expenditure spillovers, yardstick competition or tax competition) is the main 
cause of tax mimicking strategy. The reasons for this research impediment arise 
from one (or both) of the following reasons (Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli, 
2003): either the alternative theories may be observationally equivalent, or the 
available data set may not be rich enough to allow discrimination among their dif-
ferent predictions. Consequently, solving these problems requires the researcher 
either to re-examine carefully the implications of the theories to be tested, or to 
build a better data set. In this paper, we follow both strategies, checking evidence 
of tax mimicking on the most comprehensive dataset of Spanish local govern-
ments to date. Thus, our research question is to ascertain whether the agency prob-
lem in Spanish municipalities shapes tax mimicking with neighboring municipali-
ties. According to Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), yardstick competition 
theory suggests that only incumbents that face uncertain electoral outcomes 
should interact strategically with their neighbors. If a local government is pretty 
confident of re-election regardless of its tax behavior, we should not expect to find 
its fiscal choices being affected by those of its neighbors.
Edmark and Ågren (2008) document a positive spatial dependence of local income 
taxes in Swedish municipalities. However, they find weak evidence supporting the 
proposition that the spatial correlation in taxes among Swedish local governments 
can be explained by incentives to attract mobile taxpayers (Tiebout’s tax competition 
theory). Similarly, they find no support for the yardstick competition thesis.
Gérard, Jayet and Paty (2010) document the absence of interactions between Bel-
gian neighboring municipalities in terms of property tax rates. These authors 
explain their result through the immobility of the property tax base. However, this 
result contrasts with Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), who, for the same sample, 
find that tax rates are indeed copied among neighboring municipalities.
One tool incumbents may use is tax diversification, as explained by Heyndels and 
Smolders (1994) on a sample of Flemish municipalities. This means that, follow-
ing the fiscal illusion hypothesis, municipal politicians could try to align with 
neighbors’ taxes, so that their voters do not punish them for setting higher taxes 
than the neighbors. Accordingly, if expenditures raise above the neighbors’ levels 
and they must be funded with extra tax liabilities, incumbents will diversify taxes 
to diminish the impact on taxpayers. This strategy is not feasible in Spain, since 
taxes are limited by law and no municipality can create new taxes and the tax rate 
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1192.2  OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING MUNICIPAL TAX RATES (CONTROL VARIABLES)This section reviews literature on the control variables for the proposed models. 
All these variables are shown in table 1.
According to Brett and Pinkse (2000), the political alignment of the municipal 
ruling party with the national government and regional government can have an 
influence on the municipal budget (variables nation and region).
Another control variable is the population of the municipality (variable lnpopul), 
which has an impact on tax rates. Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003) find that 
population has a negative and significant impact on tax rates, which suggests econo-
mies of scale. Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) and Delgado, Lago-Peñas and Mayor 
(2015) find that municipal tax rates are higher when population increases. However, 
Brett and Pinkse (2000) report no impact of population on municipal taxes. We take 
population in log, to reduce the scale differences (Brett and Pinkse, 2000).
The political literature posits that, in general, left-wing parties favor public spend-
ing increases while right-wing parties aim at budget reductions (Tellier, 2006) and 
smaller government size (variable MCideology). Cusack (1997) defines this idea 
as the “partisan politics matters” thesis. 
We control for the electoral cycle through three dummy variables, munpreelec-
tion, munelectionyear and munpostelection, which take value 1 in the year before 
elections, in the election year and in the year after elections, respectively (Gérard, 
Jayet and Paty, 2010; Isen, 2014). Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), find 
opportunistic behavior on the part of municipal incumbents: tax rates tend to be 
systematically lower in election years. 
Unemployment can be treated as a proxy of the local economic situation. A higher 
unemployment rate has a negative effect on tax rates (variable unemploy), as 
shown by Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), Gérard, Jayet and Paty (2010) 
and Cassette, Di Porto and Foremny (2012). However, Edmark and Ågren (2008) 
and Lyytikäinen (2012) find the unemployment rate has a positive impact on local 
tax rates.
Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003) posit that theory does not univocally 
predict the effect of lump-sum grants on local tax rates. For instance, the existence 
of a “flypaper effect” would require a very small (negative) effect of grants on the 
local tax rate. Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) show theoretically how federal 
grants, measured in per capita terms (variable r_transfpc), can limit tax competi-
tion among subnational governments, correct fiscal externalities, and increase 
government spending. The previous section documented the neighbors’ property 
tax as a regressor, to account for tax mimicking, i.e. interaction effects across 
municipalities (horizontal effect). Taking grants as right hand variable tackles the 
influence of central and regional government on municipal expenditure behavior 
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120 significant coefficients for per capita grants, supporting the median voter model 
and rejecting the “flypaper effect”.
Regarding income, Brett and Pinkse (2000) propose income as determinant of 
municipal property tax base (variable income). Specifically, they include it as an 
indicator of the willingness to pay for public services. Bordignon, Cerniglia and 
Revelli (2003) find that income does not appear to have any systematic impact on 
the tax rate. Gérard, Jayet and Paty (2010) show that higher income has a positive 
effect on local property tax, which agrees with the empirical literature, where 
demand for public services is often positively correlated with income. Edmark 
and Ågren (2008) also report a positive impact of income on local income tax. 
Oates (1969) finds that local real estate values bear a significant negative relation-
ship to the effective tax rate (variable r_housevalue).
Our variable autcom controls for the impact of the regional shocks on municipal 
taxes (Isen, 2014).
The majority enjoyed by a municipal government has also an impact on taxes. 
Increased council fragmentation is associated with higher taxes (Roubini and 
Sachs, 1989; Fiva and Rattsø, 2007; Delgado, Lago-Peñas and Mayor, 2015). If a 
one-party majority applies the local coefficient, voters know exactly who to blame 
for it, but if there are many different parties, it will be the fault of all of them and 
the voter is going to make his choice based on other factors than the local coeffi-
cient application. Similarly, the higher the number of government changes, the 
weaker the political situation of the incumbents (Edmark and Ågren, 2008). These 
authors assume that an incumbent with a weak political majority will pay closer 
attention to the neighbors’ tax policy than an incumbent with a strong majority, 
who is likely to win the election irrespective of neighbors’ policies. Thus, tax rate 
mimicking is expected to be stronger in municipalities where the ruling majority 
is weak. In the presence of yardstick competition, these interaction coefficients 
should be positive and statistically significant, and should be higher the more 
changes in government take place. This theoretical issue is controlled for with 
variables cgov_1, cgov_2 and cgov_3, which will interact with the key independ-
ent variables neig_uproptaxrate and neig_cartaxaveragerate.
We also control for three additional factors with an impact on municipal taxes. 
First, Revelli (2002) finds that incumbent popularity is damaged by own tax 
increases and enhanced by neighbors’ tax increases. However, after controlling 
for the influence of national politics, the estimated electoral consequences of local 
tax increases become less significant. Accordingly, we control whether the munic-
ipal party belongs to one of the two main national parties (variable bipartisan). 
Second, we check if there was a cadastral value revaluation (dumm_yearvalu-
erev). The third factor is the total fiscal burden of the municipality (r_revenue1pc), 
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1213 ECONOMETRIC MODEL, DATA AND VARIABLES
Our initial sample consists of a panel data of 2,431 observations, which covers the 
vast majority of Spanish municipalities over 1,000 inhabitants in the 2002 to 2013 
period. This is the largest Spanish sample on tax mimicking to date. This panel 
data approach overcomes the drawbacks shown by Bordignon, Cerniglia and Rev-
elli (2003) on cross-sectional data. First, panel data allow us to control for fixed 
jurisdiction effects (unobserved heterogeneity). Second, the potential endogeneity 
of the mayor status and other variables may be controlled.
Our sample is more comprehensive than the two most relevant tax mimicking 
papers on Spanish municipalities to date. In the first, Solé-Olle (2003) considers 
the panel data (1992-1999, 8 years) of municipalities of over 5,000 inhabitants 
from one Spanish province (105 municipalities). In the second, Delgado, Lago-
Peñas and Mayor (2015) use cross-sectional data for the year 2005 for Spanish 
municipalities of over 1,000 inhabitants (2,713 municipalities). Our data also cover 
the whole country for 12 years (2002-2013), being a bit smaller because munici-
palities should be greater than 1,000 inhabitants for the whole time window.
Our Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) general equation is:
 yit = αyit-1 + ∑ βj xjit + ci + εit (1)
Where yit represents either property tax rate or car tax rate. These two taxes were 
chosen because they are the most important considering the non-financial reve-
nues of Spanish municipalities. Thus, as of 2013, property tax accounts for 
29.02%, and car tax rate represents 5.12% of total non-financial revenues.
Budget figures usually follow an incremental approach (Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy and 
Aranson, 2003). To control for this budgetary inertia, we include the lagged 
dependent variable as regressor (αyit-1) (Revelli, 2001).
Xjit is the vector of explanatory variables, i.e. socio-economic characteristics and 
further control variables (see section 2.2)
Unobservable heterogeneity is represented by ci, and εit stands for random distur-
bances.
Starting from this general equation, we include the spatial effect:
 yit = αyit-1 + ρ (∑ yjt /n) + ∑ βk xkit-1 + ci + εit (2)
As indicated by Manski (1993), social forces act on the individual with a lag 
(Edmark and Ågren, 2008), thus, socio-economic features of municipalities are 
one year retarded (∑ βk xkit-1). However, neighboring tax rates are introduced with-
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122 advance of the fiscal year, since they are shown on the budget. Therefore, all 
neighboring municipalities know the tax rates of the remaining municipalities 
before the fiscal year starts, and they can react to that information in their own 
taxes and budgets. Neighbors are defined as those municipalities sharing a com-
mon geographical border, in agreement with the literature. Information about 
local tax rates is spread mainly through local and regional newspapers and televi-
sion (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) and Edmark and 
Ågren (2008) show that municipalities that share borders with immediate neigh-
bors exert an influence on these neighbors’ tax choices. Similarly, Isen (2014) 
shows that among the theories of spillovers, spatial proximity is particularly rel-
evant. Besley and Case (1995) provide two arguments to support this definition of 
neighborhood. First, geographic neighbors are quite likely to experience similar 
shocks to their tax bases. This, besides, is controlled through time dummies and 
regional dummies in our regressions, to absorb the impact of changes in national 
economic climate and changes in national fiscal behavior or regional fiscal behav-
ior. Second, geographic neighbors belong to the same media market, thus they 
have good information about what is happening close by.
Following Edmark and Ågren (2008), we take the average tax rates of neighbors: 
ρ (∑ yjt/n), where yjt stands for the property tax rate of municipality j in year t 
(there are 1…n “j” neighboring municipalities per municipality “i”).
Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002) point out as GMM valid instruments those con-
tinuous variables that are different at each location. Accordingly, we take some 
municipal economic continuous variables as instruments. Among the endogenous 
variables, we must consider own taxes and neighbors’ taxes (yit and yjt). As Isen 
(2014) indicates, there is a correlation between the fiscal behavior of neighbors 
that cannot be interpreted causally, i.e. there is a reciprocal influence. 
As Cassette, Di Porto and Foremny (2012) show, GMM specification with time 
lagged dependent variable remains the most reliable specification based on our 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43 (2) 115-139 (2019)
1254 TAX MIMICKING IN SPANISH MUNICIPALITIES
Tables 2a and 2b show our models (equation 2). As Edmark and Ågren (2008) 
document, a positive coefficient for neighbors’ tax rates, i.e. ρ in equation (2), is 
consistent with the theories of tax competition and yardstick competition. As 
explained in the introduction, we also consider the spillover hypothesis. In our 
regressions, these coefficients are represented by variables neig_uproptaxrate and 
neig_cartaxaveragerate on tables 2a and 2b, respectively.
Columns two to five of tables 2a and 2b show GMM regressions. Hansen tests on 
tables 2a and 2b indicate weak instruments, therefore we provide robustness 
checks: instrumental variable (IV) regressions (columns six to nine on tables 2a 
and 2b). We report the corresponding regression, either random or fixed effects, 
after checking with Hausman test. The fixed effects IV equation and random 
effects IV equation are, respectively:
yit – ȳ = αyit-1 – ȳ + ρ [(∑ yjt /n) – (∑ yjt /n)] + ∑ [βk xkit-1 – x̄] + ∑ [βk xkit-1 – x̄] + εit (3)
 yit – yi = αyit-1 + ρ (∑ yjt /n) + ∑ βk xkit-1 + ∑ βk xkit-1 + ci + εit (4)
As Baskaran (2014) points out, the evidence for tax mimicking found in much of 
the previous literature might be questionable. One explanation for Baskaran’s 
finding is that intergovernmental transfers reduce the incentives to engage in tax 
competition. To control for this issue, we add inter-governmental transfers as 
independent variable (r_transfpc), as explained on section 2.2.
The second criticism Baskaran (2014) raises is that local governments might set 
their tax rates primarily according to the preferences of their citizens and consider 
their neighbors’ tax policies negligible. Such an explanation is consistent with 
Tiebout (1956).
The third shortcoming cited by Baskaran (2014) has to do with the weak instru-
ments used by the literature. In fact, we report the same problem with Spanish 
municipalities, and accordingly, we present IV regressions as robustness checks.
Lyytikäinen (2012) finds that the standard spatial econometrics methods may have 
a tendency to overestimate the degree of interdependence in tax rates. This prob-
lem appears in our regressions, since property tax mimicking coefficients in GMM 
regressions are 2 to 12 times bigger than IV property tax regressions (variable 
neig_uproptaxrate on table 2a). However, in the car tax regressions, results appear 
the other way: IV coefficients are higher than their GMM counterparts. In agree-
ment with all the above mentioned, we present the coefficients of both GMM and 
IV regressions and both estimations should be considered when drawing conclu-
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130 Regarding property tax (table 2a), neig_uproptaxrate is significant in all regres-
sions except majority=0 IV regression (column eight). As far as car tax is con-
cerned (table 2b), neig_cartaxaveragerate is significant in all regressions, both 
GMM and IV. This indicates the existence of tax competition in Spanish munici-
palities, in both property tax and car tax. However, the quantitative impact is lim-
ited, because we should be prudent and take the minimum coefficient between 
GMM and IV. Our data show that a 10% increase in a neighboring municipality’s 
property tax rate leads to a 1.3% increase in property tax rate or 2.3% for car tax 
rate. Therefore, our coefficients are lower than the average found by the literature, 
which ranges from .2 to .9. For example, Revelli (2001) reports that a 10% increase 
in the local property tax rate of a UK district’s neighbors leads to an increase of 
4-5% in its own property tax rate.
Regarding the robustness of our estimations, both GMM and IV show that there is 
tax mimicking, both in property tax and in car tax. Another point that confirms the 
robustness and economic rationality of our regressions is the value of the lagged 
dependent variable, which in all regressions except one, ranges from .43 to .95 
(less than unity), which indicates that the time series are stationary, i.e. that the 
process converges in expectation (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
In all regressions the lagged dependent variable (uproptaxrate (t-1) and cartaxaverag-
erate (t-1), respectively) shows the highest explanatory power, which agrees with the 
budgetary incrementalism predicted by Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy and Aranson (2003).
The yardstick competition hypothesis is checked through two sets of regressions 
(Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli, 2003). First, columns three and seven in tables 
2a and 2b show the regressions with interaction coefficients (cgov_1xneig_
uptaxrate, cgov_2xneig_uptaxrate and cgov_3xneig_uptaxrate; cgov_1xneig_
cartaxrate, cgov_2xneig_cartaxrate and cgov_3xneig_cartaxrate), which account 
for the interaction between the number of government changes after municipal 
elections (cgov_1, cgov_2 and cgov_3) and neighbors’ tax rates (neig_uptaxrate 
and neig_cartaxrate). As discussed in section 2.2., Edmark and Ågren (2008), 
expect tax rate mimicking to be stronger in municipalities where the ruling major-
ity is weak. In the presence of yardstick competition, these interaction coefficients 
should be positive and statistically significant, and should be higher the more 
changes in government take place (cgov_1xneig_uptaxrate < cgov_2xneig_
uptaxrate < cgov_3xneig_uptaxrate; cgov_1xneig_cartaxrate < cgov_2xneig_
cartaxrate < cgov_3xneig_cartaxrate). We find the opposite, i.e. coefficients of 
these three interaction variables are negative and not significant. Our interaction 
regressions, therefore, reject the yardstick competition hypothesis.
Second, we split the sample into two sub-samples, depending on whether or not the 
mayor has a majority in the municipal council (columns four, five, eight and nine 
on tables 2a and 2b). In the subsample with a majority, there should not be tax 
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131Cerniglia and Revelli (2003) and Costa-Font, De-Albuquerque and Doucouliagos 
(2015) point out, politicians with a majority in government have no incentives to 
benchmark their neighbors’ tax policies. In other words, only incumbents that face 
uncertain electoral outcomes interact strategically with their neighbors. In our 
regressions, both in property tax and car tax, we get exactly the opposite coeffi-
cients: municipalities with a majority in the council mimic their neighbors’ tax 
policies more (figure 1). Only in one case, car tax GMM, is the majority coefficient 
slightly smaller than the no-majority coefficient. Even in this case, first, the differ-
ence in the coefficient is only .0016, and second, the significance of the majority 
sample is higher than the no-majority sample (z values 2.35 vs 1.80, respectively).
Figure 1











majority=0 majority=1 majority=0 majority=1
GMM IV
neig_uproptaxrate neig_cartaxaveragerate
These two additional checks (interactions and majority subsamples) clearly reject 
the yardstick competition hypothesis. Therefore, our data confirm tax competition, 
but the explanation does not seem to constitute yardstick competition.
To check whether tax competition explains the tax mimicking, we run an addi-
tional GMM regression where the dependent variable is the average population 
change of the neighboring municipalities divided by the population change of 
each municipality (variable movetoneigh). If this variable is higher than one, it 
means that on average, the neighboring municipalities’ populations are growing 
more than that of the municipality at stake. As independent variables related to the 
Tiebout hypothesis, we take the neighboring municipalities’ average urban prop-
erty tax rate and car tax rate divided by the municipality at stake: uproptax_rel, 
cartax_rel, respectively. Other factors that could influence this population change 
are the municipal income level, municipality unemployment and real house value 
of neighbors divided by the municipality at stake: income_rel, unemploy_rel, 
r_housevalue_rel, respectively. Finally, other control variables are included in the 
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132 Table 3
Tax competition (Tiebout) regression
Variable description
Dependent variable movetoneigh






Average of neighbors’ urban property tax rate/



















Average of neighbors’ real house value/


































– A constant, which is not shown.
– Dummy variables for Spanish regions, which are not shown. 
Below each coefficient, z value is reported. Significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
As table 3 indicates, there is no impact of either property tax rates or car tax rates 
relative to those of the neighbors on population changes, which means that people 























































































43 (2) 115-139 (2019)
133taxes are higher than in neighboring municipalities. We confirm this feature with 
two univariate analyses. Correlation between movetoneigh and uproptax_rel: 
-0.0038, p value 0.5034; correlation between movetoneigh and cartax_rel: -0.0058, 
p value 0.3064 (correlation table available upon request to the authors). These 
results again reject the relationship of differences of tax rates among neighbors and 
population changes. These results make sense because in Spain it is not plausible 
for someone to move to another municipality, considering all the costs connected 
with this move, just because in the other municipality there are lower property and 
car tax rates. It does happen in Spain, though, that drivers fill their fuel tank in a 
region with lower gasoline tax, because in this case, the tax base can be easily 
moved just by driving some additional kilometers. However, changing residence is 
much more costly and would not withstand a simple cost-benefit analysis.
The last hypothesis that could reasonably explain this tax mimicking is the expendi-
ture spillovers idea, i.e. since municipal expenditures tend to be correlated among 
neighboring municipalities, so will tax rates. From our point of view, this is the 
hypothesis that explains the Spanish municipalities’ tax mimicking. The Spanish 
quasi-federal system that has led regions to mimic their neighbors has been repli-
cated at the municipal level, according to our data. As an example of what has hap-
pened in the regions, we have the case of airports built by regional governments. 
Currently, Spain has many regional airports that either do not work because they 
were not necessary, or the number of flights is so small that regional governments 
have to subsidize them so much that in fact they are not feasible from a budgetary 
point of view. Most of them were built in order for one region to have the same 
infrastructure as a neighboring region, without any rational economic analysis. This 
behavior has been mimicked by municipalities, who want to have, for example, a 
swimming pool like the neighboring municipality, a sports center, and so on. This 
has led to a huge number of infrastructure facilities that municipalities keep closed 
because they cannot afford their operating costs. It is worth noting that the property 
bubble that brought billions of euro to the revenues of municipal budgets helped 
municipalities to start this infrastructure race among neighboring cities and towns.
The expenditure spillovers found confirm previous literature on tax competition, 
such as Baicker (2005), who shows that individual state spending has spillover 
effects on its neighbors’ spending. Finally, our results are in line with Costa-Font, 
De-Albuquerque and Doucouliagos (2015), who find inter-jurisdictional expendi-
ture interdependence among municipalities. This means that, for example, if one 
government increases the supply of public schools, this is likely to impact on 
school supply decisions in neighboring jurisdictions.
Regarding political variables, only munpostelection shows an unambiguous pat-
tern in both property tax and car tax, with coefficients on eight regressions being 
positive and significant (only property tax GMM majority=0 regression shows a 
negative coefficient). These positive and significant coefficients indicate that 
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134 after the election. Increasing taxes this year allows three years till the next election 
year, so that tax payers forget about this tax rise and it has little or no impact on 
the electoral outcome. Our results are in line with Gérard, Jayet and Paty (2010) 
and Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), who support the hypothesis of an 
electoral cycle on property tax rates.
The municipal council ideology (MCideology) shows mixed results if we compare 
GMM and IV regressions and property tax and car tax. To provide a specific 
insight on the effect of ideology, table 4 presents a t-test of mean difference in 
variables uproptaxrate and cartaxaveragerate.
Table 4
Impact of municipal council ideology
uproptaxrate
Group Obs. Mean Std. err. Std. dev. Significance
0 (left-wing) 11,683 *** .6333 .0015 .1627 t=8.3309
Pr(T > t)=0.00001 (right-wing) 11,427 *** .6151248 .0016 .1694
cartaxaveragerate
0 (left-wing) 11,683 *** 1.3852 .0026 .2840 t=13.8303
Pr(T > t)=0.00001 (right-wing) 11,427 *** 1.3328 .0027 .2919
Significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
As table 4 indicates, right-wing parties set lower property tax rates and lower car 
tax rates. This finding agrees with the general political literature, which states that 
left-wing parties set higher tax rates than their conservative counterparts (Cusack, 
1997; Tellier, 2006). If we focus on the tax mimicking literature, our results con-
firm Delgado, Lago-Peñas and Mayor (2015), who show that leftist governments 
tend to set higher taxes.
5 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Our research questions are whether tax mimicking exists in Spanish municipali-
ties, and, if so, the identification of the source of this interaction. We consider the 
largest sample of Spanish municipalities used so far: 2,431 municipalities over 
1,000 inhabitants for 2002-2013.
Within the general framework of the agency problem, we find significant evidence 
of tax mimicking, in both property tax and car tax. Subsequently, we add analyses 
to check whether yardstick competition hypothesis or tax competition (Tiebout 
hypothesis) is the source of this tax mimicking. These further analyses reject both 
hypotheses.
Therefore, our results point to expenditure spillovers. In that respect, it seems 
municipalities are behaving like Spanish regional governments, which following 
the Spanish quasi-federal system, try to match central government’s institutions 
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135tures of their neighbors. Thus, municipalities seek to set similar levels of taxes and 
expenditures as their neighboring municipalities.
The fact that incumbents are not signaling competence through neighbor-bench-
marking tax policies does not mean that the agency problem is not present in 
Spanish municipalities. In fact, it is indicating another problem, i.e. incumbents 
do not think this strategy is worthwhile because they think that citizens do not pay 
attention to their municipal fiscal indicators when making voting decisions or 
when evaluating their politicians. This is something the central government is try-
ing to change by teaching young generations about the importance of public goods 
and the need to pay taxes fairly so that public services are funded. As a govern-
ment policy, further steps should be taken in this regard. Unfortunately, in Spain, 
parties involved in corruption have not been penalized by voters in the elections. 
Thus, there is still a long way until the Spanish population demands fiscal perfor-
mance and appropriate use of public funds from politicians. This lack of concern 
about public funds misuse is one of the reasons corruption is so widespread among 
Spanish municipalities. 
Regarding another policy implication of our findings, we must bear in mind that 
local governments are under reform in several European countries. For example, 
The Netherlands is merging municipalities; France simplified the local government 
sector to increase efficiency and to limit taxes. Knowing if yardstick competition is 
a real phenomenon may help them design a better institutional framework. In this 
point, as Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003) indicate, Tiebout’s “voting with 
your feet” (tax competition) is less relevant in Europe than in the United States, for 
example. In Spain, legislation should be aimed in such a way as to direct municipal 
governments’ decisions towards the real needs of their constituencies, rather than 
allowing incumbents to compete with neighboring municipalities’ tax and spend-
ing policies. In this respect, participatory budgets should be used as a way to 
empower tax payers about spending priorities of their municipality. However, get-
ting citizens involved in municipal issues is complicated (McKenna, 2011).
As limitations, we can point out that it is difficult to identify whether tax mimicking 
stems from tax competition, from yardstick competition, or both, because the spa-
tial reaction function of both theories is the same (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). This 
is a problem common to all papers on tax competition. In our case, these two theo-
ries have been rejected. As for the tax competition theory, our available data did not 
allow us to distinguish, within the population change, any city from which people 
were moving to other cities, as a way to clearly identify Tiebout’s “voting with your 
feet” phenomenon. Besides, a questionnaire would have had to have asked why 
each and every citizen moved from one city to another, which is almost impossible.
As far as further research is concerned, we will investigate whether municipal tax 
base revisions (cadastral values revaluation) follow a tax competition strategy. In 
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136 until their neighbors have already revalued, and therefore, the former are not 
penalized in a comparative assessment with the latter. Besides, further research 
should investigate if these revaluations follow an electoral budget cycle. Also, the 
expenditure patterns among Spanish municipalities could be investigated further. 
The idea would be to explore what determines expenditure patterns of munici-
palities (for example the ratio of material and employee expenses, etc.) in a spatial 
context (the effect of space, time and space-time parameters). Finally, as Manski 
(1993) points out, future research could add new experimental data to the analysis, 
such as questionnaires sent to municipal incumbents. This would overcome, at 
least partially, the limitation stated above.
Disclosure statement 
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